CO129-172 - Public Offices & Others - 1875 — Page 219

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I put the Memorandum into the Duc Decazes' hand this morning, and I do myself the honour to transmit a copy of it to your Lordship herewith.

I observed to the Duke that he would perhaps find the language I had used a little crude, but that I had thought it well to take advantage of the character and form of the communication, to place the English view of the matter before him in clear and simple terms.

The Duke said that this was just what he wished, and he added that, without waiting to read the Memorandum, he should like to have a little conversation with me on the subject. What, he would ask, was it that Her Majesty's Government chiefly objected to in the Treaty?

I answered, that, in the first place, Her Majesty's Government deeply regretted this first departure from the principle which had proved advantageous in the dealings of the European and American Governments with the countries in the Chinese and Japanese Seas.

Until these unfortunate French Treaties with Annam no nation had sought to obtain exclusive privileges and advantages for itself; what had been obtained by one had been obtained for all, and had been thrown open without reserve to all the world.

The Duke observed that it was France alone who had opened the trade with Annam, and that the privileges, such as they were, which she had secured to herself were only a fair compensation for the sacrifices she had made.

I replied that, without expressing an opinion as to the extent of these sacrifices, I would simply remark that if, in the negotiations with China and Japan, each Power had endeavoured to secure exclusive advantages in proportion to its own estimate of its own services in the cause, a state of things would have been produced which would have been incompatible with harmony among the Powers themselves, and with any proper and satisfactory political or commercial relations with the countries in question.

The Duke rejoined that, in the cases of China and Japan, the Powers had acted in common, and were therefore entitled to common advantages; but I reminded him that the advantages secured had been freely extended to all the world, to those nations which had made no sacrifices to obtain them as much as to those which had made the greatest.

Passing to details, the Duke observed that he did not suppose that Her Majesty's Government could have any great objection to the small differential duty in favour of Saigon which had been provided by the Treaty. France had given up very large sums of money which were due from Annam, and surely this was not an unreasonable compensation to ask. Nor did he imagine that England, or any other European Power, could view with displeasure a provision calculated to increase the prosperity of Saigon. In fact, almost all the ships which resorted to that Colony were either English or American, and Foreigners there were many more foreign than French merchants established there. They would have an ample share of any advantages which the differential duties would bring to Saigon; it was of the greatest benefit to them to have that civilized station maintained in Cochin China; and, in fact, commercially, the interest of foreigners in the Colony was greater than that of Frenchmen.

I answered that I could not but consider that the monopoly in favour of Saigon, which the Treaty endeavoured to effect, was extremely objectionable in principle, and would prove to be equally so in practice. If it was convenient and advantageous for foreign ships and foreign merchants to resort to Saigon, they would do so without compulsion, and any efforts of the French authorities to attract them by fair means would be justifiable and praiseworthy; but it was quite a different thing for France to compel them to come by obliging Annam to levy double duties upon all merchandise not passing that way. England could certainly entertain no jealousy of the French Colony of Saigon, and I was entirely of the Duke's opinion that a thriving civilized station at that place would in all probability be of great use to British and other traders. No doubt a brisk trade with the adjacent countries, whether it was in French hands or not, was likely to increase the prosperity of Saigon; but, for my own part, I doubted very much whether these attempts to establish a monopoly, and to fetter trade by the minute regulations so much in favour with French officials, were not likely to prevent such a trade springing up, and, in the end, to do more harm than good to the Colony which it was sought to benefit by these factitious means.

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The Duke went on to say that he was at a loss to understand the objections which Her Majesty's Government seem to feel so strongly with regard to the stipulations providing for the intervention of the French Consuls at the Annamese ports in commercial transactions. One of these stipulations—that requiring foreign ships to report to the French Consul, and deposit their papers with him—he himself thought questionable; but it was to be remembered that there would at first be no European officers, except Frenchmen, in Annam; that, while this continued to be the case, it was surely for the interest of foreigners to have the assistance of the French Consuls, rather than be left entirely at the mercy of the native authorities, and that, after all, Great Britain, in order to free her traders from the obligation to resort to the French Consuls, had only to make a Commercial Treaty herself with Annam, and station Consuls of her own there. The same observations would, the Duke conceived, apply to the objections of Her Majesty's Government to the jurisdiction assigned to the French Consuls, in conjunction with the Annamite authorities. All this would disappear directly England chose to send officers of her own; and, for his part, he would promise Her Majesty's Government the cordial assistance of France in negotiating a Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and Annam.

I observed to the Duke that he seemed to lose sight of the fact that the King of Annam was distinctly prohibited from making any Treaty of Commerce not in accordance with that concluded with France; that all these stipulations respecting the intervention and jurisdiction of French Consuls were included unconditionally in the French Treaty, and that no mention of their ceasing to take effect, at any time or under any circumstances, was made in any part of that Treaty.

The Duke said that certainly he had not so understood the French Treaty; that, on the contrary, his impression was that these arrangements would lapse, as a matter of course, in the case of any European Power which made a Treaty of Commerce of its own, and sent out its own officers in consequence. It was a question of interpretation, and he thought that the Governments of France and England might come to an understanding on the basis of his interpretation.

I answered that no doubt his interpretation very much lessened the objections to the stipulations in question, but that it seemed to me to be in direct contradiction to the wording of the Treaties as they now stood, and that, therefore, it would be absolutely necessary to alter that wording very materially in order to make it consistent with his views, and to satisfy foreign Governments that they could and would be carried into effect.

I proceeded to remark to the Duke that he appeared to me to treat very lightly the important question of principle involved in the assumption of jurisdiction by French authorities over foreigners in territory not French. Was he sure, I asked, that other Governments (that of the United States, for instance) would be willing to admit it?

He replied that, so long as there were no other European officers in Annam, the intervention of the French authorities was certainly for the advantage of Europeans resorting thither. For his own part, he should be quite willing that the French Assessor to the Annamite Magistrates should be excluded in the case of any European who demanded his exclusion.

I remarked that if the intervention of the French official was intended solely to confer a favour and an advantage on the European, this would appear more clearly if the wording of the stipulation was that it should be afforded in any case in which the European asked for it, and in such a case only.

Lastly, I spoke of the clause in the Political Treaty confining the protection of missionaries to Roman Catholic missionaries only, and reminded the Duke that he had more than once told me that he himself thought this clause objectionable.

The Duke appeared to have somewhat changed his opinion, for on this occasion he defended the clause on the ground that there were none but Roman Catholic missionaries in Annam; that it was very undesirable, with a view to the progress of Christianity, that dissensions among its professors should be brought to the knowledge of the natives; that it had always been found in countries of the kind that the Roman Catholic missionaries were the best pioneers, and that those of other denominations followed in their wake; and, lastly, that it was only natural that France should stipulate only for those missionaries who belonged to or were in connection with herself.

I thought it right to remind the Duke that, by assuming the extraordinary control over Annam which France seemed disposed to arrogate to herself, she assumed also a serious responsibility towards other nations, and could hardly reply to their remonstrances that she intended to consider exclusively her own citizens and her own interests and sentiments.

The Duc Decazes then referred to M. de Rochechouart's Treaty with Burmah, and seemed disposed to contrast the conduct of France in refusing to ratify that Treaty, because it might be a source of difficulty to England in Burmah, with the present proceedings of England, whose objections to the Annamese Treaty were, he said, calculated to involve France in difficulties in Annam. He appeared, however, to have entirely forgotten the purport of M. de Rochechouart's Treaty; for he supposed that, by refusing

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